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TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SELECTED AFRICAN STATES (1970-2010)

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of Terrorists activities on foreign direct investment in five selected countries in Africa. The major thrust of the study was to find out whether terrorism in its diverse dimensions had impacted positively or otherwise on FDI in the participating economies. Secondary data design was adopted to collect data from two major international data bases: The United Nations World Investment Report (UNCTAD) and Global Terrorism Database (GTD).While the UNCTAD provides FDI data, data relating to terrorist activates were obtained from GTD. The period of coverage was 40 years spanning 1970- 2010. Regression analysis through the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method was used to analyze data. Findings show that Terrorism has significant effect on FDI. Thus, increase in Terrorist activities has devastatingly negative effect on inflow of foreign investment. The implications of the study were discussed and recommendations made for policy decision.

Keywords: Terrorism, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Fatalities/Dead, Gross domestic product.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, as form of violence is inimical to a nation's growth and development. Irrespective of a country's size, political structure and capabilities, terrorism strikes with little or no mercy. Hardly would a state be totally immune to terrorist activities. Although, to some proactive and discerning states, the fear of terrorism is actually the beginning of wisdom, but to others, the mere mention of terrorism breed sorrows, tears and blood.

Although terrorism lacks a generally acceptable definition due perhaps to it socio-political coloration (Akpan, Onwuka & Onyeizube 2012), it relates to an illegitimate means of attempting to effect political change by the indiscriminate use of bloody violence. Globally, terrorism has received so much prominent amongst scholars, policy makers, and the general populace since the September 11, 2001, multiple attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States of America. Besides global terrorist activities, there are increasing number of violence attacks and insurgent activities at the regional level and many African states have suffered immense loss of human lives, properties and capital infrastructure owing to terrorism.

For instance, from the Al-Qaida attack in Mali, to the Al-Shabaab masterminded attack on the US Embassy in Kenya in 1998, and another devastating attack on Kenyan's premier shopping mall on September, 21 2013. Similarly, the Boko Haram terrorist group has provided strong operational base for international terrorism in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria has witnessed close to a decade of insurgent activities from the Boko Harem, causing mayhem, wanton destruction of lives, houses, and other critical infrastructure in the Northeast part of the country. It noteworthy that the adverse effect of terrorism consist not only in the number of casualties and massive destruction property, the economic consequences are equally weighty: dampened tourism potential; low foreign exchange; slowdown in economic activities; low productivity; decrease in GDP, and declining inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI).

Considering FDI, The United Nations World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2014) defines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as, "an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise, affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate)".

Given its potential, FDI is considered a viable source of investment income to most developing countries as it results in increased productivity (Shah, 2009; Azam & Ather, 2015) better employment opportunities, increased trade, and exposure to new technology and better foreign exchange. The role of FDI as an engine of economic growth and development in emerging economies cannot be overemphasis. Generally, no business can thrive in a tensed and unsecured environment. This has serious implication on foreign direct investment and economic growth.

Terrorism do not only breed uncertainty in the investment and financial climate but also increase security cost, reduction in output and productive capacity, reduces tourism, damaged to infrastructure and displacement of foreign direct investment which has severe implication for economic growth and development of emerging economies. For most African nations including Nigeria, insecurity arising from insurgence activities makes the nation less competitive in the world economy that if left ignored pose a very strong danger signal to unity, growth and development (Akpan *et al*, 2012).

Terrorist activities not only destroy the financial well being of any economy but also destroy the physical infrastructure and individuals' confidence in an economy. Increased terrorism has both political and economic consequences. Terrorism decreased inflows of foreign direct investments, damage in infrastructure; cost incurred in security, loss in trade, disturbed balance of payments, increased insurance premiums, and also delays in the travels, creating problems for local as well as foreign passengers. Terrorism directly creates risk and anxiety in the prevailing economy that makes individuals more conscious about their expected returns linked with any transaction. Investors think it as a harmful investment. So this increased ambiguity decreases the demand patterns and shifts the investments in some other markets. Also if governments take steps against these terrorist activities, it increases the cost for government expenditure.

Attempt has been made by African governments individually, and in corporative capacity to stem the tide of terrorist activities with little success. Though, collaboration between Nigeria and its neighboring states has provided some encouragement recently, much is still desired in the war against terrorism in Africa. However, tackling terrorism and insurgence from the perspective of FDI appears not to receive massive empirical attention from scholars. The few existing works on terrorism and FDI are country based and lacked the extensive coverage of the whole region in one study (Akpan et al, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2010; Kinyanjui, 2014). We argue that an insight into the dimension and costs of terrorism on FDI could provide viable strategic option to combat terrorism in Africa. This paper therefore attempts to investigate the link between terrorism in selected African states and the flow of foreign direct investment in three African states, namely: Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Mali and Nigeria. To achieve the objective of this study requires asking a question: What is the impact of terrorist activities on net inflow of foreign direct income from investments?

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Concept of Terrorism

Terrorism is the deliberate use or threat of use of violence and aggression by individuals or groups to gain some social or political objectives through terrorization of general public including the direct victims. Terrorist activities include bombings, suicide attacks, kidnapping, hijacking, threats, assassinations and other aggressive activities (Sandler & Enders, 2008). The economic costs related to terrorism are both direct and indirect. Direct costs resulting from terrorism include precious lives lost, cost linked with injuries, damaged goods and infrastructure and other short term loses in business and commerce etc. Indirect costs resulting from terrorist activities include greater security costs, reduced growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), increased unemployment, lost FDI, higher insurance payments and greater expected compensations for the riskier locations.

Terrorist activities not only cause damage to particular region and country's infrastructure but also destroy the financial wellbeing of the country (Rasheed & Tahir, 2012). It exerts negative impact on FDI regardless of the fact whether the source country is developed or a developing economy (Anwar & Mughal, 2013). It is obvious that the losses of human life and suffering in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can be tremendous and maybe even considered as an economic loss particularly in today's society where numbers count. This study, however, aims only at the impact of terrorism expressed in terms of FDI.

The conceptualization and the calculation of economic costs of terrorism differ widely. Nevertheless, common ground that the criteria of economic costs comprise four major dimensions exists (Looney, 2002). Those dimensions distinguish costs according to their nature, time period, impact and geographical range of impact. Another dimension that is sometimes added is the differentiation in targets of attacks. Jackson et al (2007) distinguish in this regard between government, businesses and individuals. This distinction is, however, not mutually exclusive. Macro- and microeconomic cost effects need to be considered both in the short and long run and a differentiation between direct and indirect are taken into account. Additionally, both can include domestic as well as transnational effects.

2.2 Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise, affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). Foreign business activities have become very attractive targets (Czinkota et al., 2010). They have become targets in part because they are easier to attack, partially because of the economic benefits they can bring to the local economy. Foreign investments have been a logical target since it can contribute to employment, tax revenues, and an improved economy. Terrorist attacks have led to declines in foreign investment levels (Enders & Sandler, 1996). Perhaps the most obvious was a downturn in overall foreign investment on a global level in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th in the United States in 2001. It is quite apparent that terrorists regard foreign investment as an important target. Analyses of the effects of stability on levels of foreign investment, however, have found mixed results. One study of investment in 101 developing countries found that investors restricted investments levels in the countries with higher political risk (Vadlamannati, 2012). Other analyses discovered that global conditions can influence foreign investment within the context of levels of risk. Political risk had a lessened impact on investment when global levels were greater (Meon & Sekkat, 2012). Increases in the costs for access to foreign capital can limit the availability of investment funds and actually increase the changes of conflict in developing countries, which would indicate that lowered levels of investment funds increases the chances of political violence rather than political violence leading to lower levels of investment (Chapman & Reinhardt, 2013).

The last dimension that is used in academic literature refers to the distinction of costs in macroeconomic or sectoral economic realms (Sandler and Enders, 2008: 21). The main distinction between macro- and sectoral economic vulnerabilities is that the former relates to aggregate activities while the latter corresponds to sectoral activities. Macroeconomic costs are regarded as costs that have an impact on the overall national economy and can best be measured by indicators such as the GDP, FDI, exchange rates and imports/exports. Microeconomic or sectoral costs, in contrast, correspond to welfare losses for certain sectors in a country, such as transport, energy and telecommunication. This study will focus on the impact of terrorism on FDI. The focus of this study is on both direct and indirect effects of terrorism on the macro economy and macroeconomic sectors. The direct impact of terrorist assaults can be determined relatively easily by summing up the costs of the material damage following an attack. Indirect effects are in contrast often hard to measure: 'Estimates of the costs of terror confront problems of different types, including the measurement of losses, aggregation issues, avoidance of double counting of damages in different sectors or statistics, and the causality of second round and indirect effects' (Bruck & Wickstrom, 2004: 294).

To circumvent the problems, various economic events have been used to specify indirect effect. The following events appear most frequently (Haj-Yehia, 2006; Frey et al, 2007): Uncertainty on financial markets diverts foreign resources away from the affected country and leads to a linked effect on stock markets; fear of terrorist attacks induces additional government spending on counterterrorism programs often making trade more expensive by a rise in transaction costs; fear of attacks additionally leads to a cutback of individual consumption causing an effect on private allocation by a shift of resources and uncertainty on financial markets causes a reduction of investment and a related decrease of the overall economic performance.

From these events one can derive four central macroeconomic indicators, which cover, in particular, investment and consumption rates, the ratio of public spending for counterterrorism and defense purposes, export and import figures and GDP. GDP is even considered to be an indicator of the status of an economy. It is necessary to point out that the key indicators described above are not exhaustive. Other indicators are, for instance, the effect of terrorism on exchange rates resulting from distrust in terrorism affected currency or effects on consumer sentiment, inflation, unemployment levels and interest rates (Morag, 2006). This study only covers the first four, i.e. GDP, investment, consumption and trade, as they are the most widely used indicators of calculating the impact of crisis in general and terrorism specifically (Haj-Yehia, 2006; Frey et al, 2007).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the rational choice theory of terrorism espoused majorly by Crenshaw (1992), and Sandler & Lapan (1988). The theory assumes that terrorist acts usually emanate from rational, calculated, conscious decisions. These decisions represent an optimal strategy to fulfill the sociopolitical goals of these perpetrators. In other words, terrorism might not represent pathological or illogical behavior but, could, represent the best means to fulfill personal needs in some circumstances. This theory is often applied to predict the utility of various policies. That is, this theory can be applied to ascertain whether, for example, defensive policies--such as metal detectors and other processes that increase the costs of terrorist attacks and curb the likelihood of success--or proactive measures--such as attempts to stymie resources or sponsors--are likely to be effective (Sandler & Siqueira, 2009). The theory has been criticized on the grounds that some of the behavior of terrorists seems to contradict its assumption that such acts represent optimal attempts to fulfill sociopolitical goals. Crenshaw (2000), for example, maintains the goals of terrorists are sometimes implausible. Their acts, therefore, will not fulfill their goals-and, thus, cannot be regarded as a rational attempt to pursue these objectives (Brannan, Eslerm, & Anders Strindberg, 2001). Nevertheless, the goals of terrorists might not be as tangible as overthrowing a government-but might merely, for example, corresponds to recruitment of support or assistance to family members (Azam, 2005; Brooks, 2002).

2.4 Empirical Framework

Benson, (2010) investigated how international terrorism and institutional factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from rich countries. He employed a sample of 23 FDI sending countries in the period from 1995 to 2010, and used the sample selection correction method to address the missing observations problem. The findings revealed that on average, if FDI host country increases the number of terrorist attacks towards investor by one standard deviation, there is a decrease in the flow of investment by 14 percent of the average FDI share in a host's GDP. The findings also revealed that that if one investor experiences an attack, other investors suffer from a negative spillover effect. Finally, the study revealed that that in the last 16 years by the time of the study, perceived political stability is the most important factor for FDI investments (The Eight Young Economists Seminar, 2013).

Persitz (2005) evaluated the effect of Palestinian terror on the Israeli economy by using counterfactual methodology and quarterly data for the macroeconomic aggregates of Israel and OECD countries from 1980 to 2003. He found that, since 1994, had there been no terror in Israel, the country's per-capita GDP in 2003 would have been 8.6% higher than it was. Predictions based on low future levels of terror and the absence of a peace process produced good out-of-sample fit for

2003-2005. Palestinian terror increased the shares of government expenditures and consumption and decreased the shares of trade balance and investment in GDP. Also observed was weak evidence of a structural change at the aggregate level.

Shahbaz et al. (2012) did a study to examine the relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment. They used data from 2000 to 2011, the ordinary least square testing approach was used to examine the relationship in two variables. By applying the model, they found that terrorism has significant negative effect on foreign direct investment of Pakistan. The findings revealed that due to increase in the number of terrorist attacks, foreign investors showed negative interest to invest money in Pakistan.

In a study, Bruck (2007) found that the amounts of FDI in the US before and after the September 11th attacks provide some suggestive evidence of the open-economy channel of terrorism. In the year 2000, the year before the terrorist attacks, FDI inflows represented about 15.8% of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the US. This figure decreased to only 1.5% in 2003, two years after the attacks. Conversely, FDI outflows from the US increased from about 7.2% of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation for the US in 2000 to 7.5% in 2003 (UNCTAD, 2004). Of course, not all this variation in FDI can be attributed to the effect of the September 11th attacks. As of September 2001 FDI inflows had fallen from its 2000 peak not only in the US but also in other developed economies (UNCTAD, 2002). These figures motivate the question of the extent to which an increase in the perceived level of terrorism was responsible for the drop in FDI in the US that followed the events of September 11th. Surveys of international corporate investors provide direct evidence of the importance of terrorism on foreign investment. Terrorism is rated by corporate investors as one of the most important factors influencing their FDI decisions (Global Business Policy Council, 2004).

Kydd & Walters, (2006) examines the effect of terrorist attacks on both direct costs that reflect the damage that is done and indirect costs that reflect the price of avoiding future terrorist attacks. More broadly, attacks on economic targets can be part of an attrition strategy that is designed to wear down a government and reduce public support. The attacks are intended to force the government to see that changes in policy will be easier than absorbing the damage that results from the terrorism—the costs of the terrorism will lead to the desired changes (Kydd & Walters, 2006). If national economic assets can be successfully targeted, it will reduce the resources available to the government. Reduced resources will mean lower levels of revenues for the security forces or less funding for programs that might address the legitimate grievances of the population. The absence of funding for these programs might increase dissatisfaction with the government.

Economic attacks can also force the government to divert resources to protecting a much wider group of targets. There will be opportunity costs for using resources for other purposes (Lutz & Lutz, 2013). Government funds may also be diverted to less productive investments such as counterterrorism efforts or greater funding for security forces (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008). The diversion of resources to guard additional facilities can also make it more difficult to protect the most valuable targets and limit the number of security forces available to track down and deal with the terrorist groups.

3. METHODOLOGY

Source of Data

The study employed ordinary least square method to estimate the extent and coefficient of relationship between terrorism and the flow of foreign direct investment. In order to determine the effects of terrorism on foreign economic activity, data on terrorist occurrences were correlated with later changes in foreign investment. It was assumed that greater levels of terrorist actions would have negative effects on levels of foreign investment. The data on terrorism incidents in the three selected countries of Africa were available from the Global Terrorism Database.

Population/Sample Size

The population of this study consists of all data relating to terrorism and FDI in selected African states for the period between 1970 to 2010. Thus the sample size is 40 years of data observation. This database contains information beginning in 1970 and continuing on through 2010. The data is a continuation of previous databases and includes information on both domestic and international terrorism (Global Terrorism Database, 2014). It is possible that data on domestic terrorism may be less complete for some of the earlier years. The earliest data initially only included international events, and while domestic incidents were added later, some may have been missed. The data included information on the number of incidents, fatalities, and injuries that occurred with the attacks. This information was aggregated into yearly totals for the number of incidents and deaths.

Data on foreign investment levels was derived from an UNCTAD (2012) database on national levels of foreign investment. The data was more complete from 1980 and later years. Data was less consistent for many of the sub-Saharan African countries in earlier years. With the basic data it was possible to determine if the number of terrorist incidents or the number of fatalities in one year (for example 1970) had any effect on changes in foreign investment between year one and year two (1971) or year three (1972). The analyses were undertaken beginning in 1970 through the first decade of the 21st century. It was anticipated that incidents or fatalities would be negatively associated with increases in levels of foreign investment in the following year or two years.

Technique of Data Analysis

As the explanatory variable, Terrorism was conceptualized into dimensions such as number of terrorist attack, number of fatalities, and number of injuries sustained. On the other hand, IDF was measured by net inflow of foreign direct income from investments in USD. Secondary data was used, and the data set consists of 40 observations ranging from 1970-2010.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To determine the effect of terrorist activities on foreign direct investment, linear regression analysis was performed. Regressions explain the significance of the model as a whole in explaining the dependent variable (FDI) and the contribution of terrorist activities that makes up the model as shown in Table 1

Table 1: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	. 883[a]	. 781	.770	1.960299	1.383

a. Predictors: (Constant), Terrorism: b. Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment

Table 2: ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	238.8239	1	238.8239	62.14887	.008[b]
	Residual	3.842771	39	3.842771		
	Total	242.6667	40			

a. Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment
b. Predictors: (Constant), Terrorism

The R Squared shows that the independent variable (terrorism attack) explains 78.1 percent of the variance in the FDI. Adjusted R squared (.770) attempts to correct R squared to more closely reflect the goodness of fit of the model. Use of R Squared helps in determining the model of best fit.

The results suggest that terrorism significantly affect FDI (at the 95 percent confidence level). The remaining 21.9% is due to chance variation. The Durbin Wattson (DW) of 1.383 (which is a bit greater than 1) shows the presence of autocorrelation among variables.

The analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on the regression model yielded an F-value of 62.14887, meaning that the overall equation is significant ($p< 0.01$).The value (*p-value*) of F statistics is less than 0.05 (it is actually 0.008). This implies that the independent variable (terrorism) explain the variation in the dependent variable (FDI).

The Beta Coefficients in the regression show that terrorism has made positive contribution to FDI given the beta coefficient (Beta= 0.984; t=7.88345;

p< 0.01).The findings show terrorism is statistically significant with p-values less than 0.01.

From the results of the study, it can be concluded that Terrorism activities negatively affect the FDI in the selected African nations. Terrorism activities decrease the foreign investor confidence, which decrease the FDI. These findings are in line with that of the Eight Young Economists Seminar (2013) where they found that on average, if FDI host country increases, the number of terrorist attacks towards investor by one standard deviation, there is a decrease in the flow of investment by 14 percent of the average FDI share in a host's GDP. The finding implies that if one investor experiences an attack, other investors suffer from a negative spillover effect. The finding is supported by Shahbaz *et al.* (2012) study examining the relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment where they found that due to increase in the number of terrorist attacks, foreign investors showed negative interest to invest money in Pakistan.

The findings in this study show that Terrorism is bad for the participating economies. It leads to political, economic and regional instability. Terrorism is a threat to investors' confidence in the economy. The coefficient of regression is positive and it is significant at 0.05 per cent level of significance. This implies that an increase in terrorist activities leads to a corresponding reduction in output in view of the dangers of terrorism in an economy. The pace of economic activity is reduced and or destroyed by bomb attacks in the economy. Lives are lost and production activities are halted.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Terrorism around the world is a problem for foreign direct investment (FDI). For example, a multinational corporation based in the U.S. may find a location in Africa to be attractive for setting up a plant because of the abundance of cheap and well-trained labor there. However, if that area is also a potential location for insurgency and terrorism, the multinational will have to weigh the benefits from lower wage costs against the possibility of loss of plant, manpower and equipment from terrorist attacks. On aggregate, a higher incidence of terrorism as shown in this study tends to reduce willingness to invest in a terrorism-infested area.

Given the findings, there is need to join forces in combating terrorism in Africa. All African nations should collaborate and strategize towards fighting terrorism. In this direction, there is need for cooperation in economic, regulations and other social requirements to scrutinize immigrant and other social groups in each African state. It is important for all affected African nations to invest substantially on intelligence, surveillance and information gathering processes and technology.

For this purpose there is need for training on data mining and engineering, intelligence operations, combat ready training for youths in most African communities. It also noteworthy that data storage on the effect of Terrorism on investment should be accurate and studied regularly to provide reliable basis for decision making as effort is made to combat terrorism in Africa.

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APPENDIX I

FORIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS FOR SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

YEARS	KENYA	MALI	NIGERIA	ALGERIA	ANGOLA
1970	13.8	0	205	80.12	2.4
1971	7.4	-0.6	286	0.6	1.86
1972	6.3	3.4	305	41.49	2.16
1973	17.26	0.6	373	51	7.54
1974	23.42	-0.15	257	358	6.69
1975	17.16	2.61	470.12	119	0.05
1976	46.37	2.57	339	187	-1.17
1977	56.55	3.05	440.514	178.45	0
1978	34.41	-0.89	210.933	135.15	1.87
1979	84.01	3.06	309.599	25.69	2

1980	78.97	2.37	-738.87	348.67	37.42
1981	14.15	3.68	542.327	13.21	49.05
1982	13	1.52	430.611	-53.57	115.8
1983	23.74	3.15	364.435	0.42	104.3
1984	10.75	10.07	189.165	0.8	67.14
1985	28.85	2.89	485.581	0.4	278
1986	32.73	-8.37	193.215	5.32	234
1987	39.38	-5.99	610.552	3.71	119
1988	0.39	7.05	378.667	13.02	131
1989	62.19	6.36	1884.25	12.09	200
1990	57.1	5.72972	1002.5	40	-334.5
1991	18.8	1.20522	1123.9	80	664.1
1992	6	-21.8745	1156.7	30	288
1993	2	4.1672111	1878.1	0.001	302
1994	4.3	17.471024	2287.4	0.001	170.1
1995	33	111.38981	1271.0534	0.001	472
1996	10.54714173	43.397348	2190.6847	270	180.6
1997	53	69.731303	1642.4722	260	411.7
1998	11.41357735	8.86852	1210.1053	606.6	1114
1999	13.82186242	2.1780123	1177.7079	291.6	2471
2000	110.9046111	82.439577	1309.6652	280.1	878.6
2001	5.302622602	121.73159	1277.4206	1107.9	2146
2002	27.61936327	243.80477	2040.1821	1065	1744
2003	81.74031679	132.26084	2171.3903	638	3577
2004	46.06394246	101.0023	2127.0861	882	2197
2005	21.21162187	223.80315	4978.26	1145	-1304
2006	50.67466262	83.3923	4897.81	1795.4	-37.71
2007	729.0515408	72.794497	6086.73	1661.8	-893.3
2008	95.58325009	180.2816	8248.64	2632.1	1679
2009	114.9679388	748.34705	8649.53	2746.2	2205
2010	178.0644982	405.90215	6098.96	2300.2	-3227
2011	335.2497219	556.1473	8914.89	2580	-3024
2012	258.6076357	397.86646	7127.38	3052.3	-6898
2013	505	307.85341	5608.46	2661.1	-7120
2014	989	198.92734	4693.83	1488	-3881

Source: UNCTAD, 2012

APPENDIX II

RAW DATA FOR TERRORISM ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED AFRICAN STATES

Years	KENYA	MALI	NIGERIA	ALGERIA	ANGOLA
1970	16	17	12	17	
1971	18	25	23	13	2
1972	23	3	46	46	6

1973	16	26	8	5	8
1974	3	37	5	3	3
1975	9	8	68	4	6
1976	2	5	45	26	4
1977	4	2	34	43	8
1978	5	7	69	33	9
1979	8	6	128	6	2
1980	33	3	34	21	11
1981	2	5	25	32	17
1982	3	15	68	18	13
1983	12	24	43	34	1
1984	4	2	28	25	5
1985	3	6	15	68	2
1986	5	8	38	43	6
1987	13	3	98	28	8
1988	18	6	105	15	3
1989	34	4	34	38	6
1990	23	8	26	98	4
1991	16	9	38	13	8
1992	21	2	32	34	9
1993	32	11	198	26	2
1994	14	17	154	38	32
1995	15	13	165	32	18
1996	2	1	311	56	34
1997	2	5	221	2	25
1998	4	3	741	3	68
1999	3	4	233	12	43
2000	1	26	405	54	28
2001	5	43	3547	87	15
2002	6	33	725	34	38
2003	1	6	625	12	98
2004	2	21	34	34	13
2005	4	32	67	28	34
2006	23	18	43	18	26
2007	3	2	6	13	38
2008	4	4	12	34	32
2009	3	7	43	67	18
2010	12	32	28	43	34
2011	3	34	98	6	25
2012	14	12	34	12	68
2013	11	6	26	43	43
2014	6	2	6	29	54

Source: Global Terrorism Database